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CoNTRAars-UsURY-DuAL CoNTRACTS DESIGNED TO EvADE UsURY Pno-
HIBITIONs-Plaintiff applied to the defendant finance company for a loan of 
$100. The lender agreed to advance this amount and accordingly required the 
plaintiff to execute a note in the sum of $ll4.04 payable in one year and 
secured by a chattel mortgage on an automobile, but insisted in addition that 
plaintiff purchase an investment certificate in the amount of the note, issued 
by the defendant company and bearing 2 percent interest, which certificate was 
to be paid for in twelve monthly instalments. Contending that the interest thus 
exacted was usurious, the plaintiff brought suit for cancellation of the note and 
mortgage.1 On appeal from a judgment that the loan was not usurious, held, 
affirmed with a caveat. The sale of the investment certificate was essentially a 
part of the loan transaction, so that monthly instalments on the certificate were 
in effect repayment of the loan and the totality of the arrangement was usurious. 
l.Aror. CoNST., art. XIX, §13 provides: "All contracts for a greater rate of interest than 
ten percent per annum shall be void, as to principal and interest, and the General Assembly 
shall prohibit the same by law .•.• " Although this mandate is self-executing, it has been 
implemented and amplified by statute. See Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co., 220 Ark. 
565, 249 s.w. (2d) 307 (1952). 
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But prior holdings to the contrary2 which had become a rule of property could 
not be overruled retrospectively, and the judgment in the principal case was 
therefore affirmed with a caveat that a similar course of dealing would hence-
forth be considered a single transaction and subject to the constitutional man-
date against usury. O'Brien v. Atlas Finance Co., (Ark. 1954) 264 S.W. (2d) 
839.8 
It is well settled that where the purpose of a lender is to frame a series of 
transactions devised to cloak an intent to exact excessive interest, courts will 
frustrate such evasion and ascribe to the scheme its contemplated illegal pur-
pose. 4 But the Arkansas court has consistently held that good faith collateral 
contracts will not invalidate a contemporaneous loan of money as usurious, 
although the practical effect of the aggregate of transactions might be to collect 
more than a legal rate of interest/' even though the loan is made only on condi-
tion of the borrower's assent to the collateral agreement.6 The system of dual 
contracts used in the principal case, a loan contract and simultaneous purchase 
of an investment certificate, is a most palpable means of evading the constitu-
tional limitations on interest,7 although it bears substantial similarity to approved 
systems used by building and loan associations8 and _Morris Plan banks. 9 The 
2 Simpson v. Smith Savings Society, 178 Ark. 921, 12 S.W. (2d) 890 (1929); Hick-
ingbotham v. Industrial Finance Corp., 192 Ark. 429, 91 S.W. (2d) 1023 (1936). In 
these cases the Arkansas court found the note and the instalment investment certificate 
were separate and distinct obligations, and when thus viewed and construed did not 
separately disclose USUIY· 
3 In a vigorous dissent, Griffin Smith, C.J., objected to the use of this "delightfully 
convenient judicial sedative spoken of as a caveat" to suspend the constitutional proscriP; 
tion against USUIY· Principal case at 841. Parties to similar contracts executed before the 
caveat became final were held to have no constitutional right to have the new rule applied 
to their transactions in Crisco v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., (Ark. 1953) 258'S.W. (2d) 
551, cert. den. 346 U.S. 910, 74 S.Ct. 239 (1953). On the propriety of the caveat when 
employed to announce a prospective departure from past holdings, see Lobingier, "Preced-
ent in Legal Systems," 44 MICH. L. RBv. 955 (1946); Snyder, ''Retrospective Operation 
of Overruling Decisions," 35 ILI.. L. RBv. 121 at 130 et seq. (1940); Kocourek and Koven, 
''Renovation of the Common Law through Stare Decisis," 29 !LL. L. RBv. 971 (1935); 
Stimson, ''Retroactivity in Law," 38 M:rcH. L. RBv. 30 (1939); Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis 
in Courts of Last Resort," 37 HARv. L. RBv. 409 at 426 (1924). 
4 See 2 CoNTRAcrs RBsTATEMENl' §529 (1932); 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, 2d ed., 
§1687 (1938); 6 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1501 (1951); 55 AM. ]UR., Usury §14 (1946). 
5 Simpson v. Smith Savings Society, supra note 2; Hogan v. Thompson, 186 Ark. 
497, 54 S.W. (2d) 303 (1932). See also 6 A.rut. L. RBv. 26 at 31 (1951). 
6Leavitt v. Marathon Oil Co., 186 Ark. 1077, 57 S.W. (2d) 814 (1933). Cf. 6 
CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1501, p. 946 (1951): " ••• if the loan is made only on condition 
that the other transaction shall accompany it, a finding of usurious intent may be justified." 
7This practice was held usurious in State v. Whaley, 176 Tenn. 170, 139 S.W. (2d) 
255 (1939). 
s The court in the principal case made clear that its caveat did not apply to loans made 
by "true" building and loan associations, as upheld in Reeve v. Ladies' Bldg. and Loan 
Assn., 56 Ark. 335, 19 S.W. 917 (1892); Farmers' Savings and Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. 
Ferguson, 69 Ark. 352, 63 S.W. 797 (1901). 
9 Mesaba Loan Co. v. Sher, 203 Minn. 589, 282 N.W. 823 (1938); Columbus 
Industrial Bank of Miller, 125 Conn. 313, 6 A. (2d) 42 (1940). For a rather compre-
hensive treatment of the entire area, see Collins, "Evasion and Avoidance of Usury Laws," 
8 LAw AND CoNTEM. PnoB. 54 (1941). 
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device consists of a loan at a stipulated rate for the entire term and a require-
ment that the borrower purchase a certificate having a nominal value equal 
to the amount of the loan, the purchase price being payable in periodic instal-
ments. Since these payments are not credited on the loan, the effective rate to 
the borrower is practically doubled since he has the use of the full face amount 
of the loan only until the first instalment on the investment certificate is payable, 
yet interest at the contract rate is collected for the entire term on the original 
sum lent. Surely, the Arkansas court is right, though somewhat tardy, in 
declaring this arrangement a single contract at usurious interest and clearly 
within the constitutional prohibition.10 
Richard W. Young, S.Ed. 
10 The Arkansas court has recently struck down a number of collateral devices as 
designed to exact excessive interest: Commercial Credit Plan, Inc. v. Chandler, 218 Ark. 
966, 239 S.W. (2d) 1009 (1951) (stock subscriptions); Strickler v. State Auto Finance 
Co., 220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W. (2d) 307 (1952) (special charges), noted 31 TEx. L. REv. 
345 (1953); Hare v. General. Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W. (2d) 
973 (1952) (credit sale). 
